November 16, 2026

The Economics of Golf in Asia

In Asia’s largest golf markets, the course is the scarcest part of the game. That scarcity is moving economic value toward pricing, technology and services that do not depend on new land.

November 16, 2026

Matthew Erley & Evan Roosevelt | Old Tom Capital

Outside North America, Asia is golf’s largest market. The R&A counts approximately 26.2 million adult participants across the region, including about 10.9 million 9- and 18-hole golfers in Japan and 7.0 million in South Korea. For comparison, the National Golf Foundation reported 29.1 million on-course golfers in the U.S. in 2025. Course supply across Asia’s major markets remains constrained. Japan’s course count declined from 2,460 in the year to March 2003 to 2,172 in the year to March 2025. In China, 259 courses, approximately 38 percent of the total, had closed under a national rectification program by the end of 2021. South Korea had 527 courses as of January 2026.

The combination of strong participation and constrained course supply shapes how golf creates economic value in Asia. In the mature markets, course owners have relied increasingly on pricing and operations rather than volume growth, and much of the growth in play has moved off the course into simulators, indoor venues and the technology platforms that run them. In emerging markets, where courses are few or hard to access, value is forming around visitors, events and real estate. For investors, the opportunity sits in businesses built around the constraint, not the land.

Mature Markets Lean on Pricing and Operations

Japan shows what happens when a large golf market stops adding courses and its players age. The share of rounds by golfers exempt from Japan’s golf course usage tax, a group that includes everyone aged 70 and over, rose from 4.6 percent in the year to March 2004 to about 24 percent in the year to March 2025. In the Japan Productivity Center’s 2026 Leisure White Paper, as many people played at driving ranges as on courses in 2025, 3.7 percent each, but course golfers spent about ¥166,000 ($1,110) a year against ¥34,400 ($230) for range users.

Operators have responded in part by managing price. Heiwa Corporation, which owned 321 courses through its Pacific Golf Management (PGM) and Accordia Golf subsidiaries at March 2026, reported golf segment revenue of ¥230.6 billion ($1.53 billion) and operating profit of ¥45.6 billion ($303 million), an operating margin of about 20 percent, for the year to March 2026, its first full year including Accordia Golf. Heiwa attributes its results to revenue management through appropriate pricing and to inbound demand, and reported that average spend per customer rose 2.2 percent in April to September 2026 from a year earlier, even as rain and typhoons reduced visits. With fixed supply, scale gives an operator the data and flexibility to price each tee time more precisely.

South Korea’s course economy reflects the same scarcity at higher density. Course visits reached a record of about 50.58 million in 2022 and have since fallen about 8 percent, to about 46.41 million in 2025. The Korea Golf Course Business Association puts the 2025 average at about 4,430 visitors per hole. On an 18-hole basis, that is about 80,000 visits a year in Korea, against more than 31,000 rounds per course in the United States, an OTC calculation from National Golf Foundation figures. With a golf population that The R&A puts at about seven million, that density leaves little room to grow on the course.

Asia’s Golf Lite Economy

Three structural forces explain why lighter formats have scaled in Asia: course supply that cannot meet demand, a generation of players who start off the course, and a path from those formats into wider golf spending. Korea is the clearest example. Golfzon, the country’s largest screen golf company, reported about 87 million rounds played on its systems in 2022, the year Korea’s course visits peaked, a measure of how much golf activity takes place off the course.

Many new Korean golfers start off the course. In the Korea Golf Association’s 2025 Korea Golf Index, 52.4 percent of new participants entered the game through driving ranges (29.1 percent) or indoor screen golf (23.3 percent), even though 85.9 percent of all participants played on a course during the year. In the 2021 index, 45.4 percent of golfers named indoor screen golf as their main place to play, against 13.1 percent who named golf courses, and the association attributed the shift to the cost, time and booking difficulty of course play.

At Old Tom Capital, our thesis around Golf Lite is that more accessible formats, including short courses, driving ranges and technology-enabled practice, are among the most resilient parts of the game because they reduce barriers of time, cost and intimidation. Asia shows how land scarcity can make these formats central to participation, offering a test of that investment thesis.

The players entering through these formats are younger and more diverse. In the 2021 index, women made up 34.8 percent of new golfers, compared with 28.9 percent of continuing golfers, and course play was highest among older continuing golfers. The Japan Sports Agency’s 2025 survey found women are a larger share of range and simulator golfers than of course golfers.

The same pattern is emerging in Japan and China under different conditions. In Japan, the indoor chain SMART GOLF reached 200 stores by July 2026 with an unmanned, subscription-based model. Tokyo Shoko Research reported that six driving ranges went bankrupt in the first ten months of 2025, already more than in any full year in two decades, and noted that indoor golf facilities have multiplied in cities because they cost relatively little to open. In Japan’s densest cities, Golf Lite is moving indoors. In China, where new course construction has been restricted since 2004, the China Golf Association reports a golf population of about 5.4 million people in 2024: about 4.06 million who play on courses and about 1.33 million who play at indoor venues. Its three simulator partners operated 1,859 indoor golf venues at the end of 2024, and the national total passed 2,000 in 2025.

The economic point is that indoor golf does not need the land, water or approvals that limit course supply. It can be located where people live and work, and it converts golf from a weekend outing into a more frequent, lower-cost activity.

Lighter formats also feed the rest of the golf economy, and spending rises along that path. The 2025 Korea Golf Index puts average monthly spending at about KRW 509,000 ($358) at golf courses, against about KRW 185,000 ($130) at indoor screen venues, about 2.8 times. The gap was about 2.6 times in 2023 and about 3.0 times in 2021, on a different basis.

Apparel and lifestyle spending follow the same curve. Acushnet describes Titleist apparel designed for Korea, Japan and China and exclusive Titleist and FootJoy stores in key Asia Pacific markets, and Honma describes non-club lines that offer a complete golf lifestyle. That spending is cyclical, however. Honma’s own annual report for the year to March 2026 shows its apparel sales in China fell 8.2 percent, which it attributed to weak consumer sentiment and fewer stores. The 2025 index shows a third of lapsed golfers played only off the course, against 14 percent of current participants, so progression is not automatic.

Technology Becomes the Business Model

Indoor golf turns golf into a technology and services business. Golfzon’s filings describe revenue from simulator sales, franchise and directly operated screen golf venues, online services, and partnerships and advertising. Its installed base of simulator systems in Korea grew from 33,597 in 2021 to 43,491 in 2025.

The model is also exportable. Golfzon’s screen golf exports rose from about KRW 74 billion ($65 million) in 2021 to about KRW 159 billion ($112 million) in 2025, and the company has subsidiaries in the U.S., Japan, China and Vietnam.

The business model runs on two cycles. Revenue from simulator sales and new venues follows owners’ investment, while round-linked revenue follows usage. Golfzon reported revenue of KRW 440 billion ($384 million) in 2021, KRW 685 billion ($524 million) in 2023 and KRW 483 billion ($340 million) in 2025, and operating profit of KRW 115 billion ($88 million) in 2023 and KRW 68 billion ($48 million) in 2025.

Emerging Markets Build Different Revenue Streams

Asia’s emerging golf markets are developing revenue streams before they have large domestic golfer bases. With fewer golfers and, in several cases, limited course access, early activity tends to form around cross-border play and professional events.

The clearest evidence of cross-border golf travel comes from Japan, where Heiwa reported a record 276,000 inbound visitors to its courses in the year to March 2026, nearly double the 143,000 two years earlier, with Koreans accounting for 88.5 percent. Japan’s appeal also reflects currency: 100 yen bought about 900 to 950 won on average in 2024 and 2025, against about 1,040 in 2021. Japan received about 9.46 million visitors from Korea in 2025. Vietnam, with 75 courses, is positioning itself for the same regional demand and received about 21.2 million international visitors in 2025, including about 4.33 million from Korea and 5.28 million from China. Those arrivals indicate the size of the regional market Vietnam’s courses target.

India illustrates how commercial value can develop ahead of golf infrastructure. With 289 golf courses, India has a smaller course network than Japan or South Korea, yet professional golf is attracting investment. The DP World India Championship carries a $4 million purse, and DP World has extended its title partnership for the tournament through 2035. In both markets, the revenue streams are forming before a broad domestic golf market exists, making them earlier-stage than those in Japan and Korea.

Where Capital Is Flowing

Across the region, Asian golf capital is finding value mainly through the ownership and monetization of existing assets, brands and technology rather than through new course development. In mature markets, capital is consolidating existing course networks to gain operating scale. As we noted in our piece on international course construction, Heiwa acquired Accordia Golf from Fortress Investment Group for ¥510 billion (about $3.3 billion) on an enterprise value basis, financing the purchase with a syndicated loan of the same size.

Equipment is a second source of value, particularly in South Korea. Acushnet reported 2025 net sales of $275.5 million in Korea and $131.1 million in Japan, or about $39 per R&A golfer in Korea against about $12 in Japan. Japan’s market also includes large domestic manufacturers. Acushnet attributed its 2025 decline in Korea largely to lower sales of FootJoy golf wear, primarily in footwear and apparel, and reported Korea sales about flat and Japan sales up about 11 percent in constant currency over the first nine months of 2026.

Asian investors also hold significant stakes in global golf brands. Korea’s Misto Holdings, formerly Fila Holdings, holds approximately 50.4 percent of Acushnet’s voting power through a subsidiary, following a Fila-led $1.225 billion acquisition of Acushnet in 2011.

Not every trend in Asian golf is structural. Several are partly cyclical: Korea’s 2022 peak in course visits came while outbound travel was restricted, part of Japan’s inbound golf demand reflects a weaker yen, Golfzon’s 2023 revenue peak tracked venue build-out, and apparel softness appears in both the Honma and Acushnet filings. Others are structural: the land constraint on course supply, the screen-first entry path, and the younger, more female cohort entering through these formats. Our argument rests on the structural forces.‍

Our View

The economics of golf in Asia are defined by a constraint on land. Large golf populations meet a course supply fixed by geography, regulation or demographics, and in our view that constraint is why the most distinctive value is forming around the course rather than on it. Where course supply is constrained, lighter formats provide an accessible entry point to golf and create opportunities for spending across equipment, apparel and traditional course play.

The question for investors is which business models capture that value. Owners of scarce courses capture it through pricing and operations, at significant capital cost; technology platforms through usage-linked revenue that can scale across countries, though hardware and venue build-out are cyclical; and brands through equipment and apparel spending that follows players as they become more engaged. For Golf Lite, Asia’s lesson is that the format matters less than the economics behind it. The tests for investors are specific: the share of revenue tied to ongoing play rather than hardware and build-out; utilization per bay and how it holds through a downturn; and evidence that screen-first golfers move into course play and higher spending.

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Matthew Erley & Evan Roosevelt | Old Tom Capital

Outside North America, Asia is golf’s largest market. The R&A counts approximately 26.2 million adult participants across the region, including about 10.9 million 9- and 18-hole golfers in Japan and 7.0 million in South Korea. For comparison, the National Golf Foundation reported 29.1 million on-course golfers in the U.S. in 2025. Course supply across Asia’s major markets remains constrained. Japan’s course count declined from 2,460 in the year to March 2003 to 2,172 in the year to March 2025. In China, 259 courses, approximately 38 percent of the total, had closed under a national rectification program by the end of 2021. South Korea had 527 courses as of January 2026.

The combination of strong participation and constrained course supply shapes how golf creates economic value in Asia. In the mature markets, course owners have relied increasingly on pricing and operations rather than volume growth, and much of the growth in play has moved off the course into simulators, indoor venues and the technology platforms that run them. In emerging markets, where courses are few or hard to access, value is forming around visitors, events and real estate. For investors, the opportunity sits in businesses built around the constraint, not the land.

Mature Markets Lean on Pricing and Operations

Japan shows what happens when a large golf market stops adding courses and its players age. The share of rounds by golfers exempt from Japan’s golf course usage tax, a group that includes everyone aged 70 and over, rose from 4.6 percent in the year to March 2004 to about 24 percent in the year to March 2025. In the Japan Productivity Center’s 2026 Leisure White Paper, as many people played at driving ranges as on courses in 2025, 3.7 percent each, but course golfers spent about ¥166,000 ($1,110) a year against ¥34,400 ($230) for range users.

Operators have responded in part by managing price. Heiwa Corporation, which owned 321 courses through its Pacific Golf Management (PGM) and Accordia Golf subsidiaries at March 2026, reported golf segment revenue of ¥230.6 billion ($1.53 billion) and operating profit of ¥45.6 billion ($303 million), an operating margin of about 20 percent, for the year to March 2026, its first full year including Accordia Golf. Heiwa attributes its results to revenue management through appropriate pricing and to inbound demand, and reported that average spend per customer rose 2.2 percent in April to September 2026 from a year earlier, even as rain and typhoons reduced visits. With fixed supply, scale gives an operator the data and flexibility to price each tee time more precisely.

South Korea’s course economy reflects the same scarcity at higher density. Course visits reached a record of about 50.58 million in 2022 and have since fallen about 8 percent, to about 46.41 million in 2025. The Korea Golf Course Business Association puts the 2025 average at about 4,430 visitors per hole. On an 18-hole basis, that is about 80,000 visits a year in Korea, against more than 31,000 rounds per course in the United States, an OTC calculation from National Golf Foundation figures. With a golf population that The R&A puts at about seven million, that density leaves little room to grow on the course.

Asia’s Golf Lite Economy

Three structural forces explain why lighter formats have scaled in Asia: course supply that cannot meet demand, a generation of players who start off the course, and a path from those formats into wider golf spending. Korea is the clearest example. Golfzon, the country’s largest screen golf company, reported about 87 million rounds played on its systems in 2022, the year Korea’s course visits peaked, a measure of how much golf activity takes place off the course.

Many new Korean golfers start off the course. In the Korea Golf Association’s 2025 Korea Golf Index, 52.4 percent of new participants entered the game through driving ranges (29.1 percent) or indoor screen golf (23.3 percent), even though 85.9 percent of all participants played on a course during the year. In the 2021 index, 45.4 percent of golfers named indoor screen golf as their main place to play, against 13.1 percent who named golf courses, and the association attributed the shift to the cost, time and booking difficulty of course play.

At Old Tom Capital, our thesis around Golf Lite is that more accessible formats, including short courses, driving ranges and technology-enabled practice, are among the most resilient parts of the game because they reduce barriers of time, cost and intimidation. Asia shows how land scarcity can make these formats central to participation, offering a test of that investment thesis.

The players entering through these formats are younger and more diverse. In the 2021 index, women made up 34.8 percent of new golfers, compared with 28.9 percent of continuing golfers, and course play was highest among older continuing golfers. The Japan Sports Agency’s 2025 survey found women are a larger share of range and simulator golfers than of course golfers.

The same pattern is emerging in Japan and China under different conditions. In Japan, the indoor chain SMART GOLF reached 200 stores by July 2026 with an unmanned, subscription-based model. Tokyo Shoko Research reported that six driving ranges went bankrupt in the first ten months of 2025, already more than in any full year in two decades, and noted that indoor golf facilities have multiplied in cities because they cost relatively little to open. In Japan’s densest cities, Golf Lite is moving indoors. In China, where new course construction has been restricted since 2004, the China Golf Association reports a golf population of about 5.4 million people in 2024: about 4.06 million who play on courses and about 1.33 million who play at indoor venues. Its three simulator partners operated 1,859 indoor golf venues at the end of 2024, and the national total passed 2,000 in 2025.

The economic point is that indoor golf does not need the land, water or approvals that limit course supply. It can be located where people live and work, and it converts golf from a weekend outing into a more frequent, lower-cost activity.

Lighter formats also feed the rest of the golf economy, and spending rises along that path. The 2025 Korea Golf Index puts average monthly spending at about KRW 509,000 ($358) at golf courses, against about KRW 185,000 ($130) at indoor screen venues, about 2.8 times. The gap was about 2.6 times in 2023 and about 3.0 times in 2021, on a different basis.

Apparel and lifestyle spending follow the same curve. Acushnet describes Titleist apparel designed for Korea, Japan and China and exclusive Titleist and FootJoy stores in key Asia Pacific markets, and Honma describes non-club lines that offer a complete golf lifestyle. That spending is cyclical, however. Honma’s own annual report for the year to March 2026 shows its apparel sales in China fell 8.2 percent, which it attributed to weak consumer sentiment and fewer stores. The 2025 index shows a third of lapsed golfers played only off the course, against 14 percent of current participants, so progression is not automatic.

Technology Becomes the Business Model

Indoor golf turns golf into a technology and services business. Golfzon’s filings describe revenue from simulator sales, franchise and directly operated screen golf venues, online services, and partnerships and advertising. Its installed base of simulator systems in Korea grew from 33,597 in 2021 to 43,491 in 2025.

The model is also exportable. Golfzon’s screen golf exports rose from about KRW 74 billion ($65 million) in 2021 to about KRW 159 billion ($112 million) in 2025, and the company has subsidiaries in the U.S., Japan, China and Vietnam.

The business model runs on two cycles. Revenue from simulator sales and new venues follows owners’ investment, while round-linked revenue follows usage. Golfzon reported revenue of KRW 440 billion ($384 million) in 2021, KRW 685 billion ($524 million) in 2023 and KRW 483 billion ($340 million) in 2025, and operating profit of KRW 115 billion ($88 million) in 2023 and KRW 68 billion ($48 million) in 2025.

Emerging Markets Build Different Revenue Streams

Asia’s emerging golf markets are developing revenue streams before they have large domestic golfer bases. With fewer golfers and, in several cases, limited course access, early activity tends to form around cross-border play and professional events.

The clearest evidence of cross-border golf travel comes from Japan, where Heiwa reported a record 276,000 inbound visitors to its courses in the year to March 2026, nearly double the 143,000 two years earlier, with Koreans accounting for 88.5 percent. Japan’s appeal also reflects currency: 100 yen bought about 900 to 950 won on average in 2024 and 2025, against about 1,040 in 2021. Japan received about 9.46 million visitors from Korea in 2025. Vietnam, with 75 courses, is positioning itself for the same regional demand and received about 21.2 million international visitors in 2025, including about 4.33 million from Korea and 5.28 million from China. Those arrivals indicate the size of the regional market Vietnam’s courses target.

India illustrates how commercial value can develop ahead of golf infrastructure. With 289 golf courses, India has a smaller course network than Japan or South Korea, yet professional golf is attracting investment. The DP World India Championship carries a $4 million purse, and DP World has extended its title partnership for the tournament through 2035. In both markets, the revenue streams are forming before a broad domestic golf market exists, making them earlier-stage than those in Japan and Korea.

Where Capital Is Flowing

Across the region, Asian golf capital is finding value mainly through the ownership and monetization of existing assets, brands and technology rather than through new course development. In mature markets, capital is consolidating existing course networks to gain operating scale. As we noted in our piece on international course construction, Heiwa acquired Accordia Golf from Fortress Investment Group for ¥510 billion (about $3.3 billion) on an enterprise value basis, financing the purchase with a syndicated loan of the same size.

Equipment is a second source of value, particularly in South Korea. Acushnet reported 2025 net sales of $275.5 million in Korea and $131.1 million in Japan, or about $39 per R&A golfer in Korea against about $12 in Japan. Japan’s market also includes large domestic manufacturers. Acushnet attributed its 2025 decline in Korea largely to lower sales of FootJoy golf wear, primarily in footwear and apparel, and reported Korea sales about flat and Japan sales up about 11 percent in constant currency over the first nine months of 2026.

Asian investors also hold significant stakes in global golf brands. Korea’s Misto Holdings, formerly Fila Holdings, holds approximately 50.4 percent of Acushnet’s voting power through a subsidiary, following a Fila-led $1.225 billion acquisition of Acushnet in 2011.

Not every trend in Asian golf is structural. Several are partly cyclical: Korea’s 2022 peak in course visits came while outbound travel was restricted, part of Japan’s inbound golf demand reflects a weaker yen, Golfzon’s 2023 revenue peak tracked venue build-out, and apparel softness appears in both the Honma and Acushnet filings. Others are structural: the land constraint on course supply, the screen-first entry path, and the younger, more female cohort entering through these formats. Our argument rests on the structural forces.‍

Our View

The economics of golf in Asia are defined by a constraint on land. Large golf populations meet a course supply fixed by geography, regulation or demographics, and in our view that constraint is why the most distinctive value is forming around the course rather than on it. Where course supply is constrained, lighter formats provide an accessible entry point to golf and create opportunities for spending across equipment, apparel and traditional course play.

The question for investors is which business models capture that value. Owners of scarce courses capture it through pricing and operations, at significant capital cost; technology platforms through usage-linked revenue that can scale across countries, though hardware and venue build-out are cyclical; and brands through equipment and apparel spending that follows players as they become more engaged. For Golf Lite, Asia’s lesson is that the format matters less than the economics behind it. The tests for investors are specific: the share of revenue tied to ongoing play rather than hardware and build-out; utilization per bay and how it holds through a downturn; and evidence that screen-first golfers move into course play and higher spending.

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A Friend Like Dan Hicks

There aren’t many people in life who everybody seems to like — all of us are an idiot to someone. But the rare ranks of the “beloved by all” shrank by one this week. I am gutted, and I am not alone.

It’s selfish right now to think about having lost one of my best friends, when a woman has lost her husband … and three girls he adored have lost their dad.

Still, it’s hard for me to think about what life is gonna feel like without my buddy, Dan Hicks.

We played a lot of golf together because we shared the same goofy schedule. Before even the second ring of the phone late on any random Tuesday, my wife would say: “I’m guessing it’s Dan calling to see if you want to play tomorrow.” Turns out she was right more often than not.

I met Dan Hicks at the 1990 US Open. He was working for CNN, and I was working for ESPN. We were cable outsiders and stuck together. We never unstuck.

Years later … when we became colleagues at NBC … the two of us, along with Roger … We called ourselves the supper club; we shared an appreciation for a good meal and maybe a few too many drinks. It’s entirely possible we shared more dinner tables together than we did with our families. That’s the way this business goes.

He drank Johnny Black on the rocks. He liked his NY strip medium rare, and he would eat the carrot cake, but only if I ordered it.

Plenty of people will come along in the next few days and weeks to tell you how good he was as a broadcaster. No matter what any of them say, it will never do justice to his immense talent. That he made it look so easy was his magic trick, because the truth is, there was so often mayhem in his ears. He will never get the credit he deserves because he never made it about himself. I can only hope I’ll be wrong.

You should know, though, that the most special thing about Dan was how he rooted for his friends to succeed. He was happy when we did and supported us when it wasn’t so easy.

For 25 years now, my friends have called me JRo. It’s engraved on my luggage and embroidered on my golf bag. Dan gave me that name. It’s been a long time since I’ve given that any thought, but I know I will never hear that name again without thinking of my friend.

We should all be so lucky to have someone like him in our lives. I am going to miss him something fierce.

Past Briefs

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